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When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation
Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing them to fr...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5449399/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28559538 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-02625-z |