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When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game
BACKGROUND: The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful c...
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5745956/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29281957 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12862-017-1112-y |