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Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group see...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Public Library of Science
2018
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6070290/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30028836 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006347 |