Cargando…
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example
The aim of this paper is to present a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) which is not susceptible to the Frankfurt-style counter-example. I argue that PAP does not need to be endorsed as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, in fact, presenting PAP as a sufficien...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6099989/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30158728 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9690-2 |