Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

An evolutionary game emerges when a subset of individuals incur costs to provide benefits to all individuals. Public goods games (PGG) cover the essence of such dilemmas in which cooperators are prone to exploitation by defectors. We model the population dynamics of a non-linear PGG and consider den...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kimmel, Gregory J., Gerlee, Philip, Brown, Joel S., Altrock, Philipp M.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2019
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6363775/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30729189
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s42003-019-0299-4

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6363775/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30729189
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s42003-019-0299-4

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