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A game theoretic setting of capitation versus fee-for-service payment systems
We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system. Using United States data from various primary care surveys, we find that non...
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Public Library of Science
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6779291/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31589655 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223672 |