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On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms
We study the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for eac...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer US
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6951823/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/31983796 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00453-017-0296-2 |