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Indirect genetic effects allow escape from the inefficient equilibrium in a coordination game
Social interactions involving coordination between individuals are subject to an “evolutionary trap.” Once a suboptimal strategy has evolved, mutants playing an alternative strategy are counterselected because they fail to coordinate with the majority. This creates a detrimental situation from which...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
John Wiley and Sons Inc.
2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7293076/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32547785 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/evl3.155 |