Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors

To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Su, Peiyang, Peng, Ying, Hu, Qidan, Tan, Ruwen
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2020
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7345000/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32560518
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17124346

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7345000/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32560518
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17124346

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