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Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors
To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7345000/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32560518 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17124346 |
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author | Su, Peiyang Peng, Ying Hu, Qidan Tan, Ruwen |
author_facet | Su, Peiyang Peng, Ying Hu, Qidan Tan, Ruwen |
author_sort | Su, Peiyang |
collection | PubMed |
description | To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral motives affect their decisions in terms of the incentive mechanisms. The findings showed that the collector responds to their perception of the remanufacturer’s intentions. If the perception is positive, they will make more effort in the collection work. If not, less effort will be put forth. Most importantly, we found that reciprocity helps to save the remanufacturer cost in the incentive mechanisms and makes the collector choose a higher effort level in the collection work. This finding showed that reciprocity serves to solve information asymmetry. By conducting a numerical simulation, we found that although a high subsidy policy can achieve rapid improvement of recycling-supply-chain performance, it is inefficient in maintaining friendly cooperation between the remanufacturer and the collector. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-7345000 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2020 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-73450002020-07-09 Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors Su, Peiyang Peng, Ying Hu, Qidan Tan, Ruwen Int J Environ Res Public Health Article To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral motives affect their decisions in terms of the incentive mechanisms. The findings showed that the collector responds to their perception of the remanufacturer’s intentions. If the perception is positive, they will make more effort in the collection work. If not, less effort will be put forth. Most importantly, we found that reciprocity helps to save the remanufacturer cost in the incentive mechanisms and makes the collector choose a higher effort level in the collection work. This finding showed that reciprocity serves to solve information asymmetry. By conducting a numerical simulation, we found that although a high subsidy policy can achieve rapid improvement of recycling-supply-chain performance, it is inefficient in maintaining friendly cooperation between the remanufacturer and the collector. MDPI 2020-06-17 2020-06 /pmc/articles/PMC7345000/ /pubmed/32560518 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17124346 Text en © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Su, Peiyang Peng, Ying Hu, Qidan Tan, Ruwen Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title | Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title_full | Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title_fullStr | Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title_full_unstemmed | Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title_short | Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors |
title_sort | incentive mechanism and subsidy design for construction and demolition waste recycling under information asymmetry with reciprocal behaviors |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7345000/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32560518 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17124346 |
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