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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ewerhart, Christian, Quartieri, Federico
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7357686/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32684668
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01209-4