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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7357686/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32684668 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01209-4 |