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Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives

Policy makers, employers, and insurers often provide financial incentives to encourage citizens, employees, and customers to take actions that are good for them or for society (e.g., energy conservation, healthy living, safe driving). Although financial incentives are often effective at inducing goo...

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Autores principales: Kirgios, Erika L., Chang, Edward H., Levine, Emma E., Milkman, Katherine L., Kessler, Judd B.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: National Academy of Sciences 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7382217/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32631987
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2000065117
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author Kirgios, Erika L.
Chang, Edward H.
Levine, Emma E.
Milkman, Katherine L.
Kessler, Judd B.
author_facet Kirgios, Erika L.
Chang, Edward H.
Levine, Emma E.
Milkman, Katherine L.
Kessler, Judd B.
author_sort Kirgios, Erika L.
collection PubMed
description Policy makers, employers, and insurers often provide financial incentives to encourage citizens, employees, and customers to take actions that are good for them or for society (e.g., energy conservation, healthy living, safe driving). Although financial incentives are often effective at inducing good behavior, they’ve been shown to have self-image costs: Those who receive incentives view their actions less positively due to the perceived incompatibility between financial incentives and intrinsic motives. We test an intervention that allows organizations and individuals to resolve this tension: We use financial rewards to kick-start good behavior and then offer individuals the opportunity to give up some or all of their earned financial rewards in order to boost their self-image. Two preregistered studies—an incentivized online experiment (n = 763) on prosocial behavior and a large field experiment (n = 17,968) on exercise—provide evidence that emphasizing the intrinsic rewards of a past action leads individuals to forgo or donate earned financial rewards. Our intervention allows individuals to retroactively signal that they acted for the right reason, which we call “motivation laundering.” We discuss the implications of motivation laundering for the design of incentive systems and behavioral change.
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spelling pubmed-73822172020-07-30 Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives Kirgios, Erika L. Chang, Edward H. Levine, Emma E. Milkman, Katherine L. Kessler, Judd B. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Social Sciences Policy makers, employers, and insurers often provide financial incentives to encourage citizens, employees, and customers to take actions that are good for them or for society (e.g., energy conservation, healthy living, safe driving). Although financial incentives are often effective at inducing good behavior, they’ve been shown to have self-image costs: Those who receive incentives view their actions less positively due to the perceived incompatibility between financial incentives and intrinsic motives. We test an intervention that allows organizations and individuals to resolve this tension: We use financial rewards to kick-start good behavior and then offer individuals the opportunity to give up some or all of their earned financial rewards in order to boost their self-image. Two preregistered studies—an incentivized online experiment (n = 763) on prosocial behavior and a large field experiment (n = 17,968) on exercise—provide evidence that emphasizing the intrinsic rewards of a past action leads individuals to forgo or donate earned financial rewards. Our intervention allows individuals to retroactively signal that they acted for the right reason, which we call “motivation laundering.” We discuss the implications of motivation laundering for the design of incentive systems and behavioral change. National Academy of Sciences 2020-07-21 2020-07-06 /pmc/articles/PMC7382217/ /pubmed/32631987 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2000065117 Text en Copyright © 2020 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Kirgios, Erika L.
Chang, Edward H.
Levine, Emma E.
Milkman, Katherine L.
Kessler, Judd B.
Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title_full Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title_fullStr Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title_full_unstemmed Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title_short Forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
title_sort forgoing earned incentives to signal pure motives
topic Social Sciences
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7382217/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32631987
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2000065117
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