Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

In the management of intermodal transportation, incentive contract design problem has significant impacts on the benefit of a multimodal transport operator (MTO). In this paper, we analyze a typical water-rail-road (WRR) intermodal transportation that is composed of three serial transportation stage...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Zhang, Wenying, Wang, Xifu, Yang, Kai
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2019
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7514643/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33266877
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21020161

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7514643/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33266877
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e21020161

Ejemplares similares