A Bayesian approach to investment in innovation projects with the presence of fake innovators

The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of interaction between investors and innovators, taking into account the existence of so-called “fake” innovators offering knowingly unprofitable projects. The model is a Bayesian non-cooperative, repetitive game with recalculated payments and partly unobser...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Gurtuev, Alim, Derkach, Elena, Makhosheva, Salima, Ivanov, Zaur
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2020
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701340/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294719
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05603

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701340/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294719
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05603

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