Cargando…
A Bayesian approach to investment in innovation projects with the presence of fake innovators
The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of interaction between investors and innovators, taking into account the existence of so-called “fake” innovators offering knowingly unprofitable projects. The model is a Bayesian non-cooperative, repetitive game with recalculated payments and partly unobser...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7701340/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33294719 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05603 |