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A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity

The promise of biotechnology is tempered by its potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. Reliably identifying telltale signatures characteristic to different genetic designers, termed ‘genetic engineering attribution’, would deter misuse, yet is still considered unsolved. Here, we show that re...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Alley, Ethan C., Turpin, Miles, Liu, Andrew Bo, Kulp-McDowall, Taylor, Swett, Jacob, Edison, Rey, Von Stetina, Stephen E., Church, George M., Esvelt, Kevin M.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7722865/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33293535
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19612-0
Descripción
Sumario:The promise of biotechnology is tempered by its potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. Reliably identifying telltale signatures characteristic to different genetic designers, termed ‘genetic engineering attribution’, would deter misuse, yet is still considered unsolved. Here, we show that recurrent neural networks trained on DNA motifs and basic phenotype data can reach 70% attribution accuracy in distinguishing between over 1,300 labs. To make these models usable in practice, we introduce a framework for weighing predictions against other investigative evidence using calibration, and bring our model to within 1.6% of perfect calibration. Additionally, we demonstrate that simple models can accurately predict both the nation-state-of-origin and ancestor labs, forming the foundation of an integrated attribution toolkit which should promote responsible innovation and international security alike.