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A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity

The promise of biotechnology is tempered by its potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. Reliably identifying telltale signatures characteristic to different genetic designers, termed ‘genetic engineering attribution’, would deter misuse, yet is still considered unsolved. Here, we show that re...

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Autores principales: Alley, Ethan C., Turpin, Miles, Liu, Andrew Bo, Kulp-McDowall, Taylor, Swett, Jacob, Edison, Rey, Von Stetina, Stephen E., Church, George M., Esvelt, Kevin M.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group UK 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7722865/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33293535
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19612-0
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author Alley, Ethan C.
Turpin, Miles
Liu, Andrew Bo
Kulp-McDowall, Taylor
Swett, Jacob
Edison, Rey
Von Stetina, Stephen E.
Church, George M.
Esvelt, Kevin M.
author_facet Alley, Ethan C.
Turpin, Miles
Liu, Andrew Bo
Kulp-McDowall, Taylor
Swett, Jacob
Edison, Rey
Von Stetina, Stephen E.
Church, George M.
Esvelt, Kevin M.
author_sort Alley, Ethan C.
collection PubMed
description The promise of biotechnology is tempered by its potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. Reliably identifying telltale signatures characteristic to different genetic designers, termed ‘genetic engineering attribution’, would deter misuse, yet is still considered unsolved. Here, we show that recurrent neural networks trained on DNA motifs and basic phenotype data can reach 70% attribution accuracy in distinguishing between over 1,300 labs. To make these models usable in practice, we introduce a framework for weighing predictions against other investigative evidence using calibration, and bring our model to within 1.6% of perfect calibration. Additionally, we demonstrate that simple models can accurately predict both the nation-state-of-origin and ancestor labs, forming the foundation of an integrated attribution toolkit which should promote responsible innovation and international security alike.
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spelling pubmed-77228652020-12-11 A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity Alley, Ethan C. Turpin, Miles Liu, Andrew Bo Kulp-McDowall, Taylor Swett, Jacob Edison, Rey Von Stetina, Stephen E. Church, George M. Esvelt, Kevin M. Nat Commun Article The promise of biotechnology is tempered by its potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. Reliably identifying telltale signatures characteristic to different genetic designers, termed ‘genetic engineering attribution’, would deter misuse, yet is still considered unsolved. Here, we show that recurrent neural networks trained on DNA motifs and basic phenotype data can reach 70% attribution accuracy in distinguishing between over 1,300 labs. To make these models usable in practice, we introduce a framework for weighing predictions against other investigative evidence using calibration, and bring our model to within 1.6% of perfect calibration. Additionally, we demonstrate that simple models can accurately predict both the nation-state-of-origin and ancestor labs, forming the foundation of an integrated attribution toolkit which should promote responsible innovation and international security alike. Nature Publishing Group UK 2020-12-08 /pmc/articles/PMC7722865/ /pubmed/33293535 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19612-0 Text en © The Author(s) 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
spellingShingle Article
Alley, Ethan C.
Turpin, Miles
Liu, Andrew Bo
Kulp-McDowall, Taylor
Swett, Jacob
Edison, Rey
Von Stetina, Stephen E.
Church, George M.
Esvelt, Kevin M.
A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title_full A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title_fullStr A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title_full_unstemmed A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title_short A machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
title_sort machine learning toolkit for genetic engineering attribution to facilitate biosecurity
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7722865/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33293535
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19612-0
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