Cargando…
Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aim...
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7853487/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33476337 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217 |