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Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aim...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Murase, Yohsuke, Baek, Seung Ki
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7853487/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33476337
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217
Descripción
Sumario:Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.