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Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aim...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Murase, Yohsuke, Baek, Seung Ki
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7853487/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33476337
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217
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author Murase, Yohsuke
Baek, Seung Ki
author_facet Murase, Yohsuke
Baek, Seung Ki
author_sort Murase, Yohsuke
collection PubMed
description Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.
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spelling pubmed-78534872021-02-09 Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game Murase, Yohsuke Baek, Seung Ki PLoS Comput Biol Research Article Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3. Public Library of Science 2021-01-21 /pmc/articles/PMC7853487/ /pubmed/33476337 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217 Text en © 2021 Murase, Baek http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Murase, Yohsuke
Baek, Seung Ki
Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title_full Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title_fullStr Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title_full_unstemmed Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title_short Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
title_sort friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7853487/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33476337
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217
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