The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics

We calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of n-player, m-strategy normal-form games. To obtain the ensemble, we generate payoff matrices at random. Games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium converge to the Nash equilibrium. We then cons...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Wiese, Samuel C., Heinrich, Torsten
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2021
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8525859/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34692183
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00401-3

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8525859/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34692183
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00401-3

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