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Best Reply Player Against Mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategy User
We consider matrix games with two phenotypes (players): one following a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and another one that always plays a best reply against the action played by its opponent in the previous round (best reply player, BR). We focus on iterated games and well-mixed games with re...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer US
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8709824/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34951688 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-021-00980-7 |