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Best Reply Player Against Mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategy User

We consider matrix games with two phenotypes (players): one following a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and another one that always plays a best reply against the action played by its opponent in the previous round (best reply player, BR). We focus on iterated games and well-mixed games with re...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Garay, József, Móri, Tamás F.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8709824/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34951688
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-021-00980-7

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