Agent’s Optimal Compensation Under Inflation Risk by Using Dynamic Contract Model

This paper studies the problem of principal-agent with moral hazard in continuous time. The firm’s cash flow is described by geometric Brownian motion (hereafter GBM). The agent affects the drift of the firm’s cash flow by her hidden effort. Meanwhile, the firm rewards the agent with corresponding c...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Fei, Chen, Fei, Weiyin, Zhang, Fanhong, Yang, Xiaoguang
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences 2022
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8748525/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35035180
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11424-021-0008-5

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8748525/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35035180
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11424-021-0008-5

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