Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Project Bidding Collusion in a State of Limited Rationality Based on Prospect Theory

Controlling collusion in government bidding is a prerequisite for ensuring social justice and the smooth operation of projects. Based on the prospect theory, this article establishes a four-party evolutionary game model for tenderers, enterprises with higher willingness to collude, enterprises with...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ma, Chongsen, Chen, Yun, Nie, Sirui
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Hindawi 2022
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8799336/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35096044
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/6092802

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8799336/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35096044
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/6092802

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