Green supply chain game model and contract design: risk neutrality vs. risk aversion

This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader; the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cai, Jianhu, Lin, Huazhen, Hu, Xiaoqing, Ping, Minyan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2022
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8900968/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35257336
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-18804-z

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8900968/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35257336
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-18804-z

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