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Green supply chain game model and contract design: risk neutrality vs. risk aversion
This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader; the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail...
Autores principales: | Cai, Jianhu, Lin, Huazhen, Hu, Xiaoqing, Ping, Minyan |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8900968/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35257336 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-18804-z |
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