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Incentives, lockdown, and testing: from Thucydides’ analysis to the COVID-19 pandemic
In this work, we provide a general mathematical formalism to study the optimal control of an epidemic, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, via incentives to lockdown and testing. In particular, we model the interplay between the government and the population as a principal–agent problem with moral hazard...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8995008/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35397720 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-022-01736-0 |