A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies

This paper provides a general framework for analyzing self-confirming policies. We study self-confirming equilibria in recurrent decision problems with incomplete information about the true stochastic model. We characterize stationary monetary policies in a linear-quadratic setting.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Battigalli, P., Cerreia-Vioglio, S., Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M., Sargent, T.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2022
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8995299/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35493762
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09862-9

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8995299/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35493762
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09862-9

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