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Signalling in auctions for risk-averse bidders
We study risk-averse equilibrium bidding in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions where bidders have signalling concerns, i.e., they care about how the auction outcome is interpreted by an outside observer. We find that when the winner’s identity and her payment are revealed to the outsid...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9565415/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36240242 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0275709 |