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The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge
To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one’s own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others’ knowledge. We examine how one’s knowle...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9794110/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36575349 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-022-01382-3 |
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author | Tullis, Jonathan G. Feder, Brennen |
author_facet | Tullis, Jonathan G. Feder, Brennen |
author_sort | Tullis, Jonathan G. |
collection | PubMed |
description | To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one’s own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others’ knowledge. We examine how one’s knowledge influences the calibration and resolution of participants’ estimates of novices’ knowledge. Across four experiments, participants studied trivia questions and estimated the percentage of novice participants who would know the answer across multiple study/estimation rounds. When participants were required to answer the question before estimating what novices would know, studying the facts impaired both the calibration and resolution of the estimates. Studying the facts reduced the validity of one’s experiences for predicting novices’ knowledge, and estimators utilized their own experiences less when predicting novices’ knowledge as they studied. Experimentally reducing reliance on one’s own knowledge did not improve the accuracy of estimates. The results suggest that learning impairs the accuracy of judgments of others’ knowledge, not because estimators rely too heavily on their own experiences, but because estimators lack diagnostic cues about others’ knowledge. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9794110 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Springer US |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-97941102022-12-27 The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge Tullis, Jonathan G. Feder, Brennen Mem Cognit Article To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one’s own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others’ knowledge. We examine how one’s knowledge influences the calibration and resolution of participants’ estimates of novices’ knowledge. Across four experiments, participants studied trivia questions and estimated the percentage of novice participants who would know the answer across multiple study/estimation rounds. When participants were required to answer the question before estimating what novices would know, studying the facts impaired both the calibration and resolution of the estimates. Studying the facts reduced the validity of one’s experiences for predicting novices’ knowledge, and estimators utilized their own experiences less when predicting novices’ knowledge as they studied. Experimentally reducing reliance on one’s own knowledge did not improve the accuracy of estimates. The results suggest that learning impairs the accuracy of judgments of others’ knowledge, not because estimators rely too heavily on their own experiences, but because estimators lack diagnostic cues about others’ knowledge. Springer US 2022-12-27 /pmc/articles/PMC9794110/ /pubmed/36575349 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-022-01382-3 Text en © The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2022, Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Article Tullis, Jonathan G. Feder, Brennen The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title | The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title_full | The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title_fullStr | The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title_full_unstemmed | The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title_short | The “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
title_sort | “curse of knowledge” when predicting others’ knowledge |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9794110/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36575349 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-022-01382-3 |
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