Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs

BACKGROUND: Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of communication. According to Zahavi’s Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are costly at the evolutionary equilibrium; otherwise, deception becomes common and communication breaks down. Theoretical s...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Számadó, Szabolcs, Zachar, István, Czégel, Dániel, Penn, Dustin J.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2023
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9827650/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36617556
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12915-022-01496-9

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9827650/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36617556
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12915-022-01496-9

Ejemplares similares