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Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs
BACKGROUND: Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of communication. According to Zahavi’s Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are costly at the evolutionary equilibrium; otherwise, deception becomes common and communication breaks down. Theoretical s...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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BioMed Central
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9827650/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36617556 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12915-022-01496-9 |